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Naomi Irit Richman 
The tremendous impact of the growth of Pentecostal and Charismatic movements in the global 
South on matters of money, health, sexuality - just about everything - has prompted scholars 
of Christianity of every stripe to take heed of such developments and evolve the conceptual 
analytics appropriate for deeper theorization. This is no straightforward intellectual challenge; 
the entangled genealogies of the social sciences and Christianity as culturally-produced 
discourses that largely emerged within the West makes the effort to subject Christian systems 
of belief and practice to critical analysis at best confusing, and, at worst, vertiginous. 
On first impressions, Pentecostal and Charismatic movements of the global South seem 
to capture a stirring combination of the strange and the familiar, the global and the local, and 
the pre-modern, modern and the postmodern all at once. Bound by a disciplinary oath of self-
reflexivity, anthropologists of Christianity in particular have thus been compelled to reconsider 
what it means to be ‘Other’, to excavate age-old debates about the insider/outsider problem, 
and, ultimately, to question the ongoing heuristic value of these problematics. Social scientists 
more generally have also come under pressure from postmodern critiques of the secular 
emerging from philosophy (notably, Charles Taylor’s ‘A Secular Age’), and theology (such as, 
John Milbank’s polemic against the social sciences and the Radical Orthodoxy position more 
generally), to justify and ultimately re-evaluate their agnostic (read, atheistic) commitments to 
the study of Christianity.1 
 
1 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age. (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007). John 
Milbank, Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason. Signposts in Theology. (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1990). 
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Critiques such as the ones above have not fallen on deaf ears: for example, a formidable 
group of anthropologists of Christianity are actively seeking to address the questions raised by 
these intellectual provocations, cultivating what is fast becoming known as a “theologically 
engaged anthropology”.2 Several theologians have responded with openness and reciprocity, 
making complementary efforts to incorporate social-scientific methods into their work and 
setting into motion the ethos of scholarly inter-disciplinarity that is au courant within the 
academy.3 In this article, I hope to shed light on some of the methodological challenges that 
currently face scholars in World Christianity and map out genealogically how ontology has 
come to be a concern for anthropologists of Christianity, in particular. By unravelling some of 
the guiding theoretical principles of the study of religions more generally, I will reveal more 
clearly the conditions which have ultimately rendered the ‘problem of belief’, in fact, a 
‘problem’ for (purportedly) secular explorations of Christian cultures.4 Lastly, I tentatively 
offer some of my own solutions to these predicaments – such as a reorientation away from 
belief and toward embodiment - for scholars of World Christianity going forward. 
Presenting the Problematic 
Admission to the ‘scientific conversation’ is for anthropologists predicated upon their pledging 
allegiance to the principle of objectivity, which itself has acquired a kind of ethico-religious 
status in the long shadow of Enlightenment thought. Typically, this entails maintaining a 
professional distance between oneself and one’s interlocutors, particularly with regards to 
religious belief. Holding the same religious beliefs as the ‘natives’, or perhaps any belief at all, 
 
2 J. Derrick Lemons, Theologically Engaged Anthropology: Social Anthropology and Theology in Conversation 
(Oxford University Press, 2018). 
3 N. Wigg-Stevenson, Ethnographic Theology: An Inquiry into the Production of Theological Knowledge 
(Palgrave Macmillan US, 2014). 
4 Matthew Engelke, ‘The Problem of Belief: Evans-Pritchard and Victor Turner on “The Inner Life”’, 
Anthropology Today 18, no. 6 (2002): 3–8. 
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has come to be regarded as an “embarrassing possibility”. 5  Joel Kahn observes that 
anthropologists are reluctant to present any first-order accounts of spirituality as “a 
consequence of fear of being exposed to ridicule by professional colleagues”.6 I recall a case-
in-point where at a recent conference, an anthropologist prefaced her paper on Pentecostalism 
by offering the disclaimer, “of course, I am not myself a Christian”, to which a respondent 
commented, “Are any of us?” 
This disciplinary “taboo” is nothing new.7 Bruno Latour observes that “social scientists 
have for long allowed themselves to denounce the belief system of ordinary people”.8 From 
the 1960s, Evans-Pritchard noted that his colleagues were all “bleakly hostile” to religion, 
regarding it as “not something an anthropologist, or indeed any rational person, could himself 
believe in”.9 Fuelling this attitude, Matthew Engelke argues, is “the implicit concern of the 
discipline”: that sharing religious beliefs with one’s subjects may involve “surrendering too 
much anthropological authority”, or, to put it bluntly, relinquishing too much power.10 For 
Katherine Ewing, that “the subjects of one’s research might actually know something about the 
human condition that is personally valid for the anthropologist”, threatens the privileged 
position she holds as a researcher.11 In co-opting the methodological agenda of the ‘hard’ 
sciences, anthropologists of religion re-modulate the religious subject as an item of data so that 
a process of representative objectivation can take place.12 Whilst this procedure may be apt for 
a naturalistic enquiry, human social subjects – with their many whims and fancies - are not so 
 
5 Katherine P. Ewing, ‘Dreams from a Saint: Anthropological Atheism and the Temptation to Believe’, 
American Anthropologist 96, no. 3 (1994): 571–583. 
6 Joel S. Kahn, ‘Encountering Extraordinary Worlds: The Rules of Ethnographic Engagement and the Limits of 
Anthropological Knowing’, Numen 61, no. 2–3 (18 March 2014): 247. 
7 Ewing, ‘Dreams from a Saint’. 
8 Bruno Latour, We Have Never Been Modern, translated by Catherine Porter. (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard 
University Press, 1993), 51. 
9 E. Evans-Pritchard, ‘Religion and the Anthropologists’, New Blackfriars 41, no. 480 (1960): 104, 110. 
10 Engelke, ‘The Problem of Belief’, 3. 
11 Ewing, ‘Dreams from a Saint’, 571. 
12 Gavin D. Flood, Beyond Phenomenology: Rethinking the Study of Religion (London ; New York: Cassell, 
1999). 
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easily reduced to ‘things’; as Gavin Flood has shown, they exist in a reciprocal, and at times, 
mercurial relationship of an intersubjective kind with those that study them.13 Thus, when 
adopted in the social sciences, this technique of naturalistic objectivation acts to conceal the 
privilege it bestows upon the researcher, as a detached Cogito, in the subtextual power relation 
it constructs between her and the ‘object’ of her enquiry. For which kind of allegedly-detached 
observer could this be deemed more morally problematic than for the Western anthropologist 
studying non-Western religions, including the Christianities of the global South? Under these 
conditions, the misappropriation of the naturalist’s modus operandi simply serves to 
underscore an outlook of cultural and even racial superiority that has haunted the discipline of 
anthropology historically, and perhaps still continues to do so. 
Nevertheless, the anthropologist’s perceived need to establish epistemological distance 
between herself and her informants must be countered with the commitment to minimise this 
distance simultaneously. Observing and coming to understand the inner lives of her informants 
are, after all, both the means and the ends of her method. Anthropologists must walk a tightrope 
between becoming an insider and remaining an outsider.14 This exposes a two-horned dilemma: 
either the anthropologist insists on disengaging language from ontology, or is truly converted 
by the ‘insider discourse’ and comes to accept the correspondence between meaning and 
being.15 In other words, she must either maintain allegiance to her own episteme or face up to 
the limits of it. Either way, she comes to learn that the anthropological discipline necessarily 
undercuts the value it bestows upon those methods it holds dear. In practice, this means that 
anthropologists are all too keen to maintain their willingness to become an ‘insider’ during 
 
13 Flood Beyond Phenomenology. 
14 Engelke, ‘The Problem of Belief’, 3. 
15 Flood, Beyond Phenomenology, 102. 
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fieldwork, but rarely allow themselves the possibility of sustaining this perspective when back 
in the secular arms of the academy. 
For Phillip Fountain, “the ‘temptation’ of going native” suggests that the perimeters 
between the anthropologist and her subjects are “in constant danger of collapsing”.16 This 
tightrope becomes all the more delicate to tread when the anthropologist’s subjects are 
Christian and hence most likely share parts of her own intellectual worldview. Christians 
constitute “disappointing subalterns” or “repugnant cultural ‘others’”, who appear 
“confusingly to be at once too similar and too different to be easily amenable to study”.17 This 
sense of the canny is all-the-more pronounced amongst Pentecostals of the global South, whose 
use of media technologies in particular, has been shown to create a “moral and physical 
geography whose domain is one of transnational cultural inter-penetration and flow”. 18 
Accordingly, Christianity as an object of anthropological enquiry calls for an examination of 
the ways narratives and images are circulated in an online world, and therefore the processes 
through which ‘Otherness’ is constituted and reconstituted for both Christians and those 
studying them. This involves a heightened awareness of the Christian genealogies of 
anthropological thought and the categories it employs. It demands anthropologists to reflect 
upon, even re-evaluate their own metaphysical commitments and, rather uncomfortably, 
submit themselves as objects of enquiry. In Bourdieu’s thought this entails a “second break”; 
 
16 Philip Fountain, ‘Toward a Post-Secular Anthropology’, The Australian Journal of Anthropology 24, no. 3 
(December 2013): 313. 
17 David Maxwell, African Gifts of the Spirit: Pentecostalism & the Rise of a Zimbabwean Transnational 
Religious Movement (Oxford : Athens, Ohio : Ohio University Press ; Harare, Zimbabwe: James Currey ; 
Weaver Press, 2006), 10; Susan Harding, ‘Representing Fundamentalism: The Problem of the Repugnant 
Cultural Other’, Social Research 58, no. 2 (Summer 1991): 392; Jon Bialecki, Naomi Haynes, and Joel Robbins, 
‘The Anthropology of Christianity’, Religion Compass 2/6 (2008): 1140. 
18 Rijk A. Van Dijk, ‘From Camp to Encompassment: Discourses of Transsubjectivity in the Ghanaian 
Pentecostal Diaspora’, Journal of Religion in Africa 27, no. 2 (1997): 142; Ruth Marshall-Fratani, ‘Mediating 
the Global and Local in Nigerian Pentecostalism’, Journal of Religion in Africa 28, no. 3 (August 1998): 278. 
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a breaking with the act of objectification in order to submit the objectifying mode of knowledge 
itself to a kind of reflexive analysis.19 
Genealogies of Secular Modernity 
The modern scientific discipline of anthropology was an intellectual child of the 
Enlightenment. The bracketing (epoché) of truth-claims in order to focus on analysing 
experience, a Husserlian reduction, served to emancipate the study of cultures and religions 
from the restraints of a confessionalist discourse and the “theological dogmatism” that 
accompanied it.20 Using this method, social scientists and those engaged in other modern 
scientific disciplines set aside questions about the metaphysical reality of phenomena - such 
as, in this case, religious beliefs - in their phenomenological explorations: it was felt that “the 
two ought to be practiced in separate, discrete, and specialized spaces or arenas from which 
expertise, modes of reasoning, truth claims, and values stemming from the other sphere should 
be effectively ignored” 21. As Casanova has shown, attempts at “the differentiation of the 
secular spheres (state, economy, science), usually understood as ‘emancipation’ from religious 
institutions and norms” are considered typical to processes of secularisation 22. 
Today, radical suspicion about the metaphysical reality of non-empirical phenomena 
manifests itself in the materialistic outlook of anthropological practice, which views “religion 
 
19 Pierre Bourdieu,  The Logic of Practice, trans. Richard Nice. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990) 27.  
20 Flood, Beyond Phenomenology. The idea of the “view from nowhere” goes back to Renaissance 
perspectivalism. Husserl wants us to bracket whether or not we think our perceptual noema are veridical or not. 
Feminist standpoint theorists such as Donna Haraway would argue that all human knowledge is necessarily 
human and therefore necessarily perspectival. They might claim that we should not aspire to a “view from 
nowhere” anyway. Edmund Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological 
Philosophy, 1859-1938 v.1-v.3 (The Hague ; London: Nijhoff, 1980); Donna Jeanne Haraway, Situated 
Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective (New York: 
Routledge, 1991). 
21 Kahn, ‘Encountering Extraordinary Worlds’, 241. 
22 José Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World (Chicago ; London: University of Chicago Press, 
1994); José Casanova, ‘Rethinking Secularization: A Global Comparative Perspective’, Hedgehog Review 8, no. 
1/2 (2006): 7. 
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as purely epiphenomenal to ‘real’ underlying political, economic or sociological causes”.23 A 
thoroughly secular approach to the universe that “replaces God with man” continues to orient 
discourse in the social sciences and humanities, and yet rests “on a particular ontology of reason 
and rationality that has its source in the Enlightenment”.24 As Bruce Kapferer puts it, “the 
dominating figure of Kant looms over anthropological discourse (even in his current 
Nietzschean extension or rejection)”. 25 Latour’s genealogy of modernity demonstrates 
masterfully how, with Kantianism, the distinction between subject and object is “sharpened 
into a total separation” whereby “things-in-themselves become inaccessible while, 
symmetrically, the transcendental subject becomes infinitely remote from the world”.26 Social 
theory’s epistemology of the subject/object relation, he argues, has unfolded within this 
trajectory: all objects, and especially the transcendent, are viewed through the lens of the ‘hard’ 
sciences which “are so strong that they simply determine social order which in turn becomes 
flimsy and immaterial” in comparison.27 
Insisting upon the ‘Great Divide’ (between object/subject, nature/culture, 
religious/secular, or, in my case, Pentecostal/anthropologist) has typically thwarted Western 
efforts to make sense of, and pay due respect to ‘native’ belief systems, Latour argues. The 
 
23 Fountain, ‘Toward a Post-Secular Anthropology’, 314; Fenella Cannell, ‘The Anthropology of Secularism’, 
Annual Review of Anthropology 39, no. 1 (21 October 2010): 85–100. For example, in their study of conversion 
accounts amongst the Tswana society in southern Africa, anthropologists of Christianity Jean and John 
Comaroff  concluded that “in most situations of ‘religious’ transformation, professions of new belief...belied the 
fact that older modes of thought and action were never fully laid aside”. Ruth Marshall, known for her work on 
Pentecostals in Nigeria, has aligned herself with the Comaroffs more recently, stating that they “rightly question 
the notion of conversion itself” on the grounds that the term ‘conversion’ reifies the role of religious belief in 
abstraction from its wider socio-cultural context. In response, Joel Robbins has criticised the Comaroffs on the 
grounds that their “engagement with the logic of Christianity is never described in detail”. He concludes that 
their refusal to take conversion seriously allows them to discount conversion as a “significant analytic category 
in its own right”, in their own words. Jean Comaroff and John L Comaroff, Of Revelation and Revolution 
(University of Chicago Press, 1991), 247; Ruth Marshall, Political Spiritualities: The Pentecostal Revolution in 
Nigeria (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009), 56; Joel Robbins, ‘Continuity Thinking and the Problem 
of Christian Culture: Belief, Time, and the Anthropology of Christianity’, Current Anthropology 48, no. 1 
(February 2007): 8; cf. Comaroff and Comaroff, Of Revelation and Revolution, 250.  
24 Bruce Kapferer, ‘Anthropology. The Paradox of the Secular’, Social Anthropology 9, no. 03 (2001): 342. 
25 Kapferer, 341. 
26 Latour, We Haver Never Been Modern, 56. 
27 Latour, We Haver Never Been Modern, 54. 
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modern and secular mythology, formed in the crucible of post-Kantian ontology, thus “consists 
in imagining ourselves as radically different” to those who do not subscribe to the modern 
orientation, who thus become “premodern by contrast”. 28 As a corollary, colonialists have 
typically accused natives of making a “horrible mishmash of things and humans, of objects and 
signs”.29In sub-Saharan Africa in particular, intricate, hybridized networks commonly span 
across the civic and domestic spheres, expressing themselves in patron-client relationships 
which end up looking ‘corrupt’ from a Western gaze.30In this way, the narcissistic narrative of 
secular positivism becomes trapped in its own reflection - unable to constitute itself as much 
more than, at best, a triumph of reason over folly, or at worst, a vicious attack on those 
worldviews that were, or ‘remain’ enchanted.  
Methodological Secularism: A Religious Ideology 
Anthropology’s “cavalier attachment to secular rationalism” is propped up by a kind of implicit 
certainty that operates as though it were a religious ideology, and as such the discipline has 
developed its own “doctrine of cultural relativism”.31 For Talal Asad, liberalism presents itself 
as a kind of “redemptive myth” which virtually parodies that of Christian salvation narrative.32 
Graham Ward calls secularism “fragile because private interests are always leaking into public 
space” and “incoherent because as an enforced ideology it is at odds with liberal freedoms and 
 
28 Latour, We Haver Never Been Modern, 116, 38. Post-colonial theorists also engage in this project, oftentimes 
viewing the pre-colonial period through rose-tinted (and historically inaccurate) lenses (for an example of this 
discussion, see John DY Peel, ‘Gender in Yoruba Religious Change’, Journal of Religion in Africa 32, no. 2 
(2002): 136–166; Oyèrónkẹ́ Oyěwùmí, The Invention of Women: Making an African Sense of Western Gender 
Discourses (Minneapolis ; London: University of Minnesota Press, 1997). 
29. Latour, We Haver Never Been Modern, 39. 
30 For example, Daniel Jordan Smith’s eye-opening anthropological monograph about corruption in 
contemporary Nigeria illustrates how “in a patron-client system, almost everyone has a stake in corruption”. 
This, he concludes, propels Nigerians to participate in corruption even if they simultaneously attempt to resist it; 
it is a “culture of corruption” as much as it is a “culture against corruption”. Daniel Jordan Smith, A Culture of 
Corruption: Everyday Deception and Popular Discontent in Nigeria (Princeton ; Oxford: Princeton University 
Press, 2007), 13, 5. 
31 Kapferer, ‘Anthropology. The Paradox of the Secular’, 342; Ewing, ‘Dreams from a Saint’, 578. 
32 Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University 
Press, 2003), 26. 
N. Richman. Entangled Genealogies and False Dichotomies: Anthropology, Theology and the Post-Secular 
Paradigm in World Christianity. Journal of World Christianity, Vol. 9 (No.1) (2019), 61-74. 
 
9 
 
the democracy of human rights”.33 Secularism “presents itself as universal, neutral with regard 
to all particular cultural roots”, and yet “continues to rely on categories that remain 
Eurocentric” as Žižek has shown.34Those secularising maxims pawned from phenomenology 
and deployed by anthropologists of religion have not been developed since their adaptation by 
Van der Leeuw, and yet, Flood observes, “outside of religious studies things have moved on 
considerably and the phenomenological tradition has offered critiques of Husserlian method”.35 
It is for reasons such as the ones above that anthropologists of religion continue to draw 
on a mixture of phenomenological and post-phenomenological, modern and postmodern, 
Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment, and ‘secular’ and religious methods and assumptions 
simultaneously, unwittingly applying latent categories they themselves have so convincingly 
deconstructed in recent times. This is evidenced in their employment of epoché whilst 
simultaneously accepting the critiques of standpoint theory, in their insistence on the possibility 
of objectivity whilst maintaining there is no ‘view from nowhere’, and steadfast adherence to 
relativism as an absolute. Far from furthering the anthropological project, secularism in this 
sense functions as an undetected ideological motivator and an obstacle to the discipline’s 
progress. 36 
Others have raised ethical reservations about the kind of relativism that a secular 
anthropology assumes. A liberal and culturally relativistic approach fosters a kind of “blindness 
to oppression on behalf of the respect for the other’s culture”, viewing cultural differences as 
“something given, something that cannot be overcome, but must be merely tolerated”.37 Whilst 
the “suspension of disbelief” may be a productive strategy for winning over informants in the 
 
33 Graham Ward, Unbelievable: Why We Believe and Why We Don’t (I.B.Tauris, 2014), 177. 
34 Slavoj Žižek, ‘Tolerance as an Ideological Category’, Critical Inquiry 34, no. 4 (2008): 667. 
35 Flood, Beyond Phenomenology, 16. 
36 Charles Stewart, ‘Secularism as an Impediment to Anthropological Research’, Social Anthropology 9, no. 3 
(2001): 325–328. 
37 Žižek, ‘Tolerance as an Ideological Category’, 667, 660. 
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field, it “hardly seems the best model for conducting respectful intercultural relations more 
broadly and over the longer term”, Kahn acknowledges.38 I would push this even further: from 
my own fieldwork experiences amongst deliverance Pentecostals in Nigeria, Los Angeles, and 
Oxford, honest discussion about my own religious, cultural and to some extent ethical views 
has proved not only unavoidable but imperative in gaining the trust and respect of my 
interlocutors. Naturally, they desire for their openness to be reciprocated and surely deserve 
that too. To my informants, by remaining silent in response to questions relating to my own 
worldview I am necessarily situating myself in an antagonistically secular and atheistic space, 
for my silence speaks of a false sense of neutrality or betrays a claim to having superior 
(perhaps cultural and racial) access to objectivity. It disguises the kind of voyeuristic power 
play involved in penetrating another’s interior world whilst protecting one’s own, like asking 
someone to strip naked whilst remaining fully clothed.  
Nevertheless, these challenges to the pre-existing epistemological canon are not to be 
underestimated; it is perhaps precisely because of the difficulty in accessing our own biases, 
affects and convictions that Christianity has received the least anthropological analysis of all 
the world religions so far.39 Numerous scholars have drawn attention to the ‘invisibility’ of 
race, class, gender, sexual orientation and ability in dominant social science discourses which 
renders the power it wields and the differences it obfuscates almost imperceptible and hence 
insidious.40 The secular habitus is so much a part of contemporary modern life that it is “not 
easy to grasp it directly”: it is a field of doxa, of “that which is taken for granted…[which] goes 
without saying because it comes without saying”.41The established social and cosmological 
 
38 Kahn, ‘Encountering Extraordinary Worlds’, 242. 
39 Charles Taylor, Philosophical Arguments (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 
1995). 
40 Richard Dyer, ‘The Matter of Whiteness’, in White Privilege: Essential Readings on the Other Side of 
Racism, ed. Paula S. Rothenberg, 3rd ed. (Worth Publishers, 2005); Susan Brooks Thistlewaite, Sex, Race and 
God (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1990). 
41 Asad, Formations of the Secular, 166–67. 
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order is not perceived as arbitrary but “as a self-evident and natural order…validated by the 
objective consensus on the sense of the world”, which is why Asad concedes it must be pursued 
“through its shadows” to be rendered visible.42A highly cognitive form of critical reflection 
may allow us to invert these ‘shadows’ and illuminate the shadow-puppets behind the screen, 
but nevertheless, this only takes us so far. After all, the move is not in itself sufficient to 
debilitate the disciplinary effects of these power structures and hence ultimately dissolve all 
epistemological divisions between anthropologists and their informants.  
Secularism: The Religion that is Not One 
Christian theologians remonstrate against the fact that the social sciences have carved a space 
for religion such that it can be “observed, mapped and catalogued without posing any threat to 
the observer”.43 Some protest that such a move has served to “police the sublime” and hence 
disarm it, resulting in the ghettoization of theology in the modern university setting.44 By 
locating itself firmly on the secular side of this distinction, anthropology inadvertently foils its 
own claims to religious neutrality, which are pure fiction.45For the Anglican theologian John 
Milbank, the ‘religious’ ideology of the social sciences renders their work more accurately a 
kind of “theology or anti-theology in disguise”.46  In moving forward, we must resist the 
temptation to view the religious and scientific approaches as in pursuit of different kinds of 
questions about reality, as mutually exclusive realms, or as “non-overlapping magisteria”, as 
Stephen Jay Gould has argued.47 If anthropology in fact has its own ‘secular’ mythos and ethos, 
 
42 Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, 166–67; Asad, Formations of the Secular, 16. 
43 Fountain, ‘Toward a Post-Secular Anthropology’,313. 
44 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 140; Graham Ward, Theology and Contemporary Critical Theory, 2nd 
ed. (United Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), viii. 
45 Cannell, ‘The Anthropology of Secularism’. 
46 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 3. 
47 Stephen Jay Gould, ‘Nonoverlapping Magisteria’, Skeptical Inquirer, no. 23 (1999): 55–61. 
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however concealed they may be, theology is not absent from anthropology; it is merely 
“repressed”.48 
Even so, it must be noted that Milbank has also been complicit in fostering this false 
dichotomy between religious and secular belief, and he is not exceptional amongst theologians 
in this regard. “Every discipline must be framed by a theological perspective,” he writes, 
“otherwise these disciplines will define a zone apart from God, grounded literally in nothing” 
(italics mine).49 For Milbank and the Radical Orthodoxy movement of which he is a part, that 
‘God’ necessarily denotes the Christian God, but what of adherence to other faiths? Is the 
‘crossed-out God’ necessarily the same for you as it is for me, or anyone else for that matter?50 
Is the only choice available to me that of confessing the truth of Christianity or descending into 
nihilism?  
These questions hint at the confusion this kind of Manichean approach can promulgate. 
Milbank’s straw-man argument serves to ‘other’ secularism, constructing it as the feminine 
‘other’, “the religion which is not one”.51It underestimates the human epistemological capacity, 
reducing its functions to that of a computer’s, oscillating between outputs of 0-1 and only 
printing in shades of black and white. Upon reflection, surely we can concede that any position 
can have multiple opposites. Probing these dualisms reveals that the referent of the ‘other’ 
shifts depending on the context. In a scholastic context, reason’s ‘other’ is faith. In a modern 
context, the opposite of reason may be emotion. Yet, that would surely not mean that faith is 
actually identical to emotion!  
 
48 Cannell, The Anthropology of Christianity, 4. Asad’s first chapter in Formations explicitly addresses myth 
See Asad, Formations of the Secular. See also Chapter 7, ‘Myths, Lies and Ideology: The Politics of Belief’ in 
Ward, Unbelievable, 2014. 
49 John Milbank, Catherine Pickstock, and Graham Ward, eds., Radical Orthodoxy: A New Theology (London ; 
New York: Routledge, 1999), 3. 
50 Latour, We Have Never Been Modern, 33. 
51 Although, presumably, Milbank would protest that Christianity is the oppressed ‘other’ in this dichotomy. 
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In this way, both theologians and social scientists become complicit in the act of 
“qualify[ing] the binary opposition by recognising the presence of the ‘other’ in each category” 
(atheism/theism), rather than problematising it.52 As a result, “the hierarchical opposition, the 
story it emplots, and the points of view engendered remain essentially intact”, as Susan Harding 
has persuasively shown.53 One’s opponent’s positions are thus reduced to that of mere false 
consciousness, with Christians maintaining that those who are ‘secular’ participate in 
behaviour that should rightly be called religious and self-identified secularists collapsing faith 
into a hard-line materialism. Instead, a better way of getting beyond the impasse would surely 
be to submit the terms of the choice itself – and the compulsion we feel to make that choice - 
to critical analysis.  
Towards Solutions 
The contemporary ‘postmodern’ paradigm in the humanities has opened up a line of 
communication between those working in social and critical theory, and those theologians 
whose contributions had been rendered opaque under the harsh light of Enlightenment 
epistemology. 54  The critical engagement with Saint Paul as a political and philosophical 
exemplar of radical change represents an important example of how “the shame associated with 
admitting religious belief in the secular world of the human sciences” has begun to dissipate.55 
Some theologians have responded to these invitations with reciprocity, seeking to incorporate 
social scientific methods into their work. For instance, Sarah Coakley speaks of her desire to 
 
52 Harding, ‘Representing Fundamentalism’, 391–93. 
53 Harding, ‘Representing Fundamentalism’, 391. 
54 I am thinking of the contributions of the Continental theorists in particular, such as Alain Badiou, Gilles 
Deleuze, Julia Kristeva and others. 
55 William A Johnsen, ‘The Religious Turn: René Girard’, English Language Notes, Literary History and the 
Religious Turn, 44, no. 1 (Spring 2006): 5; Alain Badiou, Saint Paul: The Foundation of Universalism, Cultural 
Memory in the Present (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2003); Giorgio Agamben, The Time That 
Remains: A Commentary on the Letter to the Romans, trans. Patricia Dailey, Meridian (Stanford, Calif.) 
(Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2005). 
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draw on the social sciences in her Trinitarian theology, so that they “may become handmaids 
of theological awareness, not tools of theological reduction”.56 
Anthropologists are also actively seeking new ways in which it is possible to take 
religion “seriously” today in anthropology.57 Michael Scott calls for “more biblically literate, 
theologically acute ethnography”, whilst Kahn suggests that “at a minimum, we need to 
proceed methodologically as if…there were some sort of residue that transcends all such 
‘mediating’ processes”, a residue that “escapes cultural, linguistic, discursive, psychoanalytic, 
sociological, or neurological analysis”.58 Robbins argues that Milbank’s provocation does not 
necessarily mean anthropologists must “commit ourselves to Christianity”, but rather, to 
“finding real otherness in the world” (italics mine).59 This surely begins with the deployment 
of a critical awareness of the role of theological ideas in the formation of the concepts and tools 
deployed by anthropologists.60 For Latour, this demands the mapping out of those complex, 
hybridised networks which are concealed behind “our strange obsession with dichotomies” that 
embolden us to believe we are successfully distinguishing between 'Us’ and ‘Them’.61 It would 
reveal that both theology and anthropology are not disciplines unmoored from their historical 
contexts but are in fact cultural productions inseparable from other forms of cultural production 
and from each other. It is the disentanglement of the two to begin with, (Latour’s process of 
“purification”), which has given a false sense of their incommensurability.  
 
56 Sarah Coakley, God, Sexuality and the Self: An Essay ‘on the Trinity’ (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2013), 12. 
57 Joel Robbins, ‘Afterword: Let’s Keep It Awkward: Anthropology, Theology, and Otherness’, The Australian 
Journal of Anthropology 24, no. 3 (December 2013): 331. 
58 Michael W. Scott, ‘“I Was Like Abraham”: Notes on the Anthropology of Christianity from the Solomon 
Islands’, Ethnos 70, no. 1 (2005): 120; Kahn, ‘Encountering Extraordinary Worlds’, 245-6. 
59 Joel Robbins, ‘Anthropology and Theology: An Awkward Relationship?’, Anthropological Quarterly 79, no. 
2 (2006): 292. 
60. For example, Talal Asad, Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and 
Islam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993); Marshall Sahlins et al., ‘The Sadness of Sweetness: 
The Native Anthropology of Western Cosmology [and Comments and Reply]’, Current Anthropology 37, no. 3 
(1996): 395–428. 
61 Latour, We Have Never Been Modern, 103. 
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Invigorating the body as a site for critical analysis will also serve to redress the 
overstated focus on belief in the academic study of religions more generally, as Asad has so 
convincingly demonstrated. After all, the content and structure of belief is not purely cognitive 
or intellectual; it is also physiological and affective, and these features it shares with “disbelief” 
too. 62  The strong emphasis on the legitimacy of somatic indexes for God’s presence in 
Pentecostalism – for example in glossolalia, deliverance, being slain in the Spirit, and so on - 
call for a recognition of the significance of “nonlinguistic variables”, (e.g. affective, imaginal 
and haptic) in shaping those experiences and the theologies they give rise to.63 A theologically 
and anthropologically literate project should therefore aim to produce thick descriptions that 
tie in with the “new centrality of the body” as a “reinvigorated site of knowledge, analysis, and 
investigation” in the humanities and social sciences more broadly.64 
Conclusion 
Whilst the Christianities of the global South have been addressed by both theologians and 
anthropologists alike, a widespread assumption that these groups of scholars seek to ask 
different questions in their explorations nevertheless prevails: the former, it is said, are 
concerned with ‘truth’, whereas the latter are simply interested in describing, deconstructing, 
and demystifying said practices from a position of cultural relativism. With help from the 
contributions of scholars operating in theology and the study of religions, I have argued here 
that the alleged distinction between a prescriptive (confessional and theological) approach and 
a descriptive (anthropological) one is to some extent illusory: the emergence of the fact/value 
 
62 Ward, Unbelievable. 
63 Jorge N. Ferrer and Jacob H. Sherman, The Participatory Turn: Spirituality, Mysticism, Religious Studies 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 2008), 2. 
64 Ferrer and Sherman, The Participatory Turn, 12. 
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distinction can be situated historically in modernity, and is actually a distinction of value 
A/value B rather than anything else.  
How then should scholars in World Christianities resolve their methodological 
predicaments, and approach their subject matter in today’s ‘post-secular’ intellectual context? 
My response is not to feign that anthropologists, despite their protestations, subscribe to 
positions that have been enmeshed, historically, with Christianity, or that they should now 
profess them from a confessional standpoint. That position conceals another agenda at work in 
theology - a conservative undercurrent which seeks to apportion the blame for the anomie in 
our contemporary world on secularisation, whilst nevertheless maintaining that the emergence 
of the secular masks the ongoing, even foreordained Christianization of the world. Instead, my 
response is to submit the theological and anthropological approaches to the same degree of 
critical analysis, regarding them both as cultural productions that emerged in particular 
historically contingent conditions. It is to recognise the force behind value A and value B and 
understand how, historically, these values have come to gain that force. It is to avoid remaining 
captive to the “immanent frame”, instead choosing to problematise its apparatus and to 
recognise the “dialogical” nature of any encounter between oneself and one’s religious subjects 
– Christian or otherwise.65 And, finally, it is to place oneself in an “open space”, where one 
can feel the force of all kinds of beliefs, shifting with the winds.66 
 
65 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age; Flood, Beyond Phenomenology. 
66 Taylor, A Secular Age, 549 cf.; William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human 
Nature, (Auckland, New Zealand: The Floating Press, 1902).  
